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 On the dynamics of competing energy sources




We characterize the dynamics of energy markets in which energy is
derived from polluting (fossil) and clean (solar) resources. The analy-
sis is based on geometric optimal control considerations. An important
feature of solar energy technologies is that their cost of supply is pre-
dominantly due to upfront investment in capital infrastructure (rather
than to actual supply rate) and this feature has important implica-
tions for the market allocation outcome. In particular, it gives rise to a
threshold behavior in that solar energy is adopted only when the price
of fossil energy exceeds a certain threshold. Under this condition solar
technologies will (eventually) dominate energy supply by driving fossil
energy altogether out of the energy sector. A tax on fossil energy can
have a substantial impact since it changes the threshold price. A quan-
tity restriction (e.g., a cap on fossil energy) allows for the coexistence
of clean and polluting energy technologies also in the long run, and its
e®ect on the use of fossil energy is more moderate.
Keywords: fossil and solar energy, optimal processes, characteristic curves,
price thresholds, environmental regulation.
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Fossil fuels are often mentioned as the main culprit for an impressive list
of undesirable consequences, including acid rain, smog, increased atmospheric
concentration of greenhouse gases and ¯nancing of failed states and terror
organizations. Yet, they continue to be the primary source of energy gener-
ation worldwide, fueling over 80% of total energy production and this share
is not expected to decline anytime soon (International Energy Agency 2008).
The obvious reason is that the market price of fossil energy is in most places
cheaper than any of the alternative energy sources available. Market prices,
however, ignore externalities and the adverse consequences listed above are
all external e®ects par excellence. Regulating these external e®ects requires
understanding the underlying market forces that determine the allocation of
energy generation between fossil and alternative sources. We characterize the
dynamics of the market allocation processes and use this framework to study
market-based regulation in the form of taxes or production caps on fossil en-
ergy.
The economic processes underlying the energy sector are of interest because
of the social relevance associated with environmental consequences and be-
cause their study reveals a rich plethora of dynamic behavior, calling for novel
techniques of characterization and interpretation (Haurie 2005, Bencheckroun
et al. 2005, Haurie and Moresino 2006). The recent Special Issue of Automat-
ica (Haurie and Malham¶ e 2008) attests to the increasing attention they receive
from the Dynamic Optimization community (see, in particular Bahn et al.
2008, Leizarowitz 2008). The present work contributes to this line of research
by presenting a complete analytic characterization of the multi-dimensional
1energy allocation processes via geometric optimal control considerations.
We study an economy in which energy is a primary input of production
along with the traditional labor and capital inputs. Energy can be derived
from fossil fuels or from alternative sources, e.g. solar, wind or hydro, referred
to generically as solar energy. Solar energy entails none of the external e®ects
listed above and also di®ers in another important respect: while fossil energy
generation depends on supply of fuels that give rise to a substantial variable
cost component, solar energy generation is based on capital designated espe-
cially for that purpose. Once the solar infrastructure (wind turbines, solar
thermal collectors, photovoltaic panels) has been installed, the generation of
solar energy entails very little additional cost. This distinguishing feature is
important for understanding the market forces underlying the energy sector
and the ensuing market allocation of fossil and solar energy. In particular
it gives rise to a threshold fossil energy price below which solar energy will
never be used. In contrast, if the price of fossil energy exceeds this threshold,
investment in solar energy capital will begin at some ¯nite time and gradually
increase until eventually driving fossil energy out of the energy sector alto-
gether. The threshold e®ect, in turn, renders the market allocation sensitive
to the details of the regulation policy designed to restrict the use of fossil
energy.
The economy, described in Section 2, consists of a ¯nal good sector, an
energy sector, and households owning labor and capital. The energy sector
consists of fossil energy ¯rms and solar energy ¯rms. This structure extends
that of Tsur and Zemel (2008) by treating solar energy as an endogenous sec-
tor of the economy.1 In Section 3 the dynamic market allocation processes are
1In Tsur and Zemel (2008) solar energy is purchased at a given (exogenous) price.
2characterized (the long-run equilibrium as well as the transition path leading
towards it). This task is carried out by analyzing the geometric relations
between the characteristic curves (Tsur and Zemel 2005, 2007) that give rise
to the turnpike of this problem. Here, however, an essential input (energy)
consists of a combination of state and control variables, hence the usual char-
acteristic curves (the singular arc and the locus of feasible equilibria) must be
complemented by a third curve, measuring the demand for energy when the
latter is supplied at the fossil price. The intersection of the curves determines
the above-mentioned threshold fossil price which is shown to provide a neces-
sary and su±cient condition for the adoption of solar technologies. Economies
that satisfy this condition, referred to as solar-based economies, begin to in-
vest in solar capital at some ¯nite time, gradually increasing the share of solar
technologies in total energy generation until eventually driving fossil energy
out of the energy sector altogether. In economies that fail to satisfy this con-
dition (referred to as fossil-based economies) investment in solar capital never
takes place unless induced by some form of regulation. In order to focus
attention on the di®erence in cost structure between the two energy sources
and the associated threshold, the analysis in this section abstracts from other
important features of the energy market such as the technological constraints
associated with solar energy as well as trends and °uctuations in the price of
fossil energy and regulation measures to address the externalities entailed by
its use.
Two common forms of energy regulation, namely fossil emission taxes and
production caps, are studied in Section 4. As expected, both policies reduce
the use of fossil energy in the long run. However, the threshold feature of
the market allocation outcome implies that an emission tax can have a drastic
3e®ect if set at a rate that gives rise to an e®ective fossil energy price above
the threshold energy price, in which case the economy's type switches from
fossil-based to solar-based. Under the fossil energy cap policy, the use of
fossil energy will not diminish below the imposed cap, hence the e®ect of this
regulatory tool is more moderate than that of the emission tax.
The literature on energy economics and the competition among various
technologies is vast and no attempt is made to review it here. Early concerns
revolved around scarcity of fossil resources and the limit it imposes on economic
growth (Barnett and Morse 1963). Technological progress and discoveries of
new coal, oil and gas reserves on the one hand, together with rapidly deterio-
rating environmental quality on the other, have swung the pendulum towards
environmental concerns. R&D e®orts to develop a backstop substitute for
fossil fuels have been suggested as an answer to both the scarcity and environ-
mental concerns (Nordhaus 1973, Dasgupta and Heal 1974, 1979, Dasgupta
and Stiglitz 1981, Tsur and Zemel 2003, and references they cite). The recent
Stern (2007) and IPCC4 (2007) reports added urgency to the environmental
concerns and renewed interest in threats associated with advancing occurrence
of catastrophes of global scale (Clarke and Reed 1994, Tsur and Zemel 1996,
Alley et al. 2003, N½vdal 2006, Roe and Baker 2007, Weitzman 2009). The
regulation literature deals primarily with tradeo®s between prices (carbon tax)
and quantity (cap-and-trade) measures (see Stern 2007, Bushnell et al. 2008,
Dietz and Maddison 2009, and reference cited there). The present e®ort stud-
ies the market forces underlying the penetration of solar energy technologies
and provides the analytic framework to compare these regulation measures
within a dynamic context.
42 The economy
The economy consists of a ¯nal good sector, an energy sector and house-
holds. We discuss each in turn.
2.1 Final good
Firm i uses capital Ki, energy Xi = X
f
i + Xa
i and labor Li to produce
output Yi according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology Y (Ki;Xi;Li),
where X
f
i is fossil energy and Xa
i is energy derived from alternative sources,
such as solar and wind, which serve as perfect substitutes. We refer to these
alternative sources generically as `solar energy'. Thus,
Yi = Liy(k;x) (2.1)
where y(k;x) ´ Y (k;x;1), k ´ Ki=Li and x ´ Xi=Li are the same across
¯rms that use the same technology, hence the ¯rm subscript i can be dropped.
The production function y(¢;¢) satis¯es the standard properties
y(0;x) = 0; y(k;0) = 0; yk(k;x) > 0; yx(k;x) > 0; yk(0;x) = 1;




where k and x subscripts signify partial derivatives with respect to k and x.
Firms take as given the capital rental rate r, the prices of fossil and so-
lar energy, pf and pa, and the wage rate w and plan production in order to
maximize instantaneous pro¯t




a ¡ w] (2.3)
5where xf and xa are, respectively, the per worker fossil and solar energy in-
puts and ± is the capital depreciation rate. Necessary conditions for pro¯t
maximization include
yk(k;x) = r + ± (2.4)
and
yx(k;x) = p ´ min(p
f;p
a): (2.5)
As fossil and solar energy are perfect substitutes, ¯rms will use only the cheaper
source if pf 6= pa and will be indi®erent between the two sources if pf = pa.





a = px: (2.6)
2.2 Energy
Aside from the external e®ects listed in the introduction (and addressed
in Section 4), fossil and solar energy di®er in one main respect: while fossil
energy depends on the supply of fuels that give rise to a substantial variable
cost component, solar energy supply is based on capital designated especially
for that purpose (wind turbines, solar thermal collectors, photovoltaic panels).
Once the solar infrastructure has been installed, the generation of solar energy
entails hardly any further cost. When solar capital is irreversible (cannot be
rented in and out), this feature implies that the decisions of managers of solar
energy ¯rms are of an intertemporal investment type. These considerations
are explicitly addressed below.
2.2.1 Fossil energy
Let ³ represent the unit cost of fossil energy, assumed constant. The supply
curve of fossil energy is therefore horizontal and the competitive price of fossil
6energy is
p
f = ³: (2.7)
When the price of energy is ³, ¯nal-good ¯rms will demand the energy input
x such that (cf. (2.5))
yx(k;x) = ³: (2.8)
For any capital stock k, we denote by x³(k) the energy input x that satis¯es
(2.8).
2.2.2 Solar energy
Production of solar energy uses capital designated solely for that purpose
such that the energy output of solar energy ¯rm j is
X
a
j = bAj; (2.9)
where Aj is the ¯rm's stock of solar capital and b is a technological parameter
indicating the rate of energy output per unit of capital. Solar capital depre-
ciates at the same rate ± as capital k, but is irreversible in that it cannot be
rented in and out. Thus, the ¯rm is locked with its existing capital and will
supply the solar energy it produces at the going market price p(t), obtaining
the revenue °ow p(t)bAj(t).
Based on the market prices p(t) (of energy) and r(t) (of capital) the in-










_ Aj(t) = Ij(t) ¡ ±Aj(t) (2.11)
7and Aj(0) = 0. The upper bound ¹ Ij on the investment rate is due to physical
and ¯nancial constraints.2
We let I(t) =
P
j Ij(t) represent aggregate investment in solar energy cap-
ital, A(t) =
P
j Aj(t) denotes the aggregate stock of solar capital, Xa(t) =
bA(t) is the aggregate solar energy supply rate and ¶(t), a(t) and xa(t) = ba(t)
denote their per-capita counterparts. The per-capita solar capital evolves in
time according to
_ a(t) = ¶(t) ¡ ±a(t) (2.12)





f(t) + ba(t): (2.13)
2.3 Households
The household income at time t consists of wage income w(t) plus inter-
est on savings r(t)k(t) plus revenues from solar energy ¯rms (owned by the
households) pa(t)xa(t) minus the investment costs of solar ¯rms ¶(t). In equi-
librium, the wage rate that clears the labor market gives vanishing pro¯ts to
the ¯nal good producers, implying, noting (2.3) and (2.7),
w(t) = y(k(t);x(t)) ¡ ³x
f(t) ¡ p
a(t)x
a(t) ¡ [r(t) + ±]k(t): (2.14)
The household income, thus, equals y(k(t);x(t))¡³xf(t)¡¶(t)¡±k(t), which
the household allocates between consumption c(t) and saving, giving rise to
the intertemporal budget constraint
_ k(t) = y(k(t);x
f(t) + ba(t)) ¡ ³x
f(t) ¡ ¶(t) ¡ ±k(t) ¡ c(t): (2.15)
2The exact value of the upper bound is insigni¯cant so long as it is large enough to avoid
feasibility restrictions on the optimal processes.
8The utility from consuming at the rate c is u(c), assumed increasing, strictly
concave and satisfying u(0) = ¡1, so that some positive consumption is





where ½ is the pure (utility) rate of discount. The household seeks the con-
sumption stream c(t) that maximizes (2.16) subject to (2.15), given k(0) = k0.
In doing so households take ¯rms (energy and ¯nal good) decisions exoge-
nously.
2.4 Equilibrium
The economy is in equilibrium when all actors (households, managers of
¯nal good ¯rms, managers of fossil energy ¯rms and managers of solar en-
ergy ¯rms) act rationally and none has an incentive to modify decisions. In
equilibrium, the energy and capital price processes, fp(t);r(t); t ¸ 0g, clear
the energy and capital markets, i.e., at each point of time energy demand by
the ¯nal good ¯rms just equals the energy supply of fossil and solar ¯rms and
households savings just equal the capital demand of the ¯nal good ¯rms.
Absent market failures, the competitive equilibrium processes are socially
optimal in that they maximizes (2.16) among all feasible processes. We use
this property to characterize the market allocation processes in the next sec-
tion. In Section 4 we study market-based environmental regulation.
3 Market allocation
Without external e®ects and other sources of market failure, the market
mechanism will give rise to an optimal allocation. Thus, the market allocation







subject to (2.12) and (2.15), c(t) ¸ 0, xf(t) ¸ 0, ¶(t) 2 [0;¹ ¶], k(0) = k0 > 0
and a(0) = 0. This intertemporal optimization problem has two states (the
ordinary and solar capital stocks k and a) and three controls (consumption
c, investment in solar capital ¶, and fossil energy input xf). We refer to the
solution of (3.1) as the market allocation processes. We characterize these
processes by means of three characteristic curves, de¯ned in the capital-energy
(k;x) plane.
3.1 Characteristic curves
We specify three curves that divide the (k;x) plane into distinct regions,
in each of which the market allocation is restricted to a particular behavior.
The ¯rst curve corresponds to the \singular" policy under which
yk(k(t);x(t)) = byx(k(t);x(t)); (3.2)
i.e., the marginal products of k and of a are kept equal during a non-vanishing
time interval. Condition (3.2), called the singular condition, de¯nes a curve
in the (k;x) plane, denoted xs(k) and referred to as the singular curve. The
term \singular" comes from the property that problem (3.1) is linear in the
solar investment rate ¶(t). This implies that the optimal ¶(t) process can
either assume the corner values ¶ = ¹ ¶ or ¶ = 0 or a singular, intermediate value
(see Appendix B). The latter policy ¶ = ¶s is optimal when the (k;x) process




xs0(k)[y(k;xs(k)) ¡ c ¡ ±k] + ±xs(k)
b + xs0(k)
; (3.3)
10where xs0(k) ´ dxs=dk.3
A second curve in the (k;x) plane, denoted xe(k), is de¯ned by the condi-
tion
yk(k;x) = ½ + ±: (3.4)
Points along this curve satisfy the Ramsey condition (Ramsey 1928) for a
steady state, hence we refer to it as the steady state curve.
The third curve, denoted x³(k), corresponds to energy demand when the
unit price of energy is ³. It is de¯ned by condition (2.8), which relates the
marginal product of energy to the unit cost of fossil fuel. This curve depicts
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Figure 1: Characteristic curves for solar-based economies
Figures 1 and 2 display the three curves for a Cobb-Douglas technology
3The singular policy ¶s is feasible when the optimal consumption rate c yields ¶s 2 [0;¹ ¶].
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Figure 2: Characteristic curves for fossil-based economies
y = y0k®x¯ with ® > 0; ¯ > 0 and ® + ¯ < 1. As a matter of notation, we
say that (k;x) is above or below xj(¢), j = e;s;³, if x > xj(k) or x < xj(k),
respectively. The geometrical relations among the three curves underlie the
characterization of the market allocation processes. For example, a point
above the singular curve represents a surplus of solar capital (relative to phys-
ical capital k) and implies the market outcome ¶ = 0 (no solar investment).
Using assumption (2.2), we verify in Appendix A the following properties:
Property 3.1. The three characteristic curves (i) converge at the origin (0;0),
and (ii) are increasing (i.e. dxj(k)=dk > 0, j = e;s;³).
Assuming that each pair of curves cross at least once away from the origin
(i.e. with k > 0; x > 0), their relative geometry is completely determined:
Property 3.2. (i) x³(¢) crosses xs(¢) once from above. (ii) xe(¢) crosses
xs(¢) once from below. (iii) x³(¢) crosses xe(¢) once from above.
12Let kse denote the k level at which xs(¢) and xe(¢) intersect, ks³ be the k
level at which xs(¢) and x³(¢) intersect, and k³e be the k level at which x³(¢)
and xe(¢) intersect. Note that k³e must always fall between the two other
intersection points (Figures 1-2). In general, the three intersection points
di®er and the long term evolution of the economy depends on their relative
positions. We investigate the long-run market allocation in the next subsection
and study the transitional path in subsection 3.3.
3.2 Long-run market allocation
De¯ne












0 if kse > k³e
xe(^ k) otherwise
; (3.5c)
^ y = y(^ k; ^ x
f + b^ a); (3.5d)
^ ¶ = ±^ a (3.5e)
and
^ c = ^ y ¡ ³^ x
f ¡ ±(^ k + ^ a): (3.5f)
Then (see proof in Appendix B):
Proposition 3.1. The market allocation processes converge to the steady state
speci¯ed by equations (3.5) from any capital endowment k0 > 0 and a0 = 0.
13From (3.5b)-(3.5c) we see that solar energy prevails in the long run if
kse > k³e. To see why, notice that kse > k³e implies yx(kse;xe(kse)) < ³ (see
Figure 1 and note that yx < ³ above x³). The singular and steady state curves
intersect at (kse;xe(kse)) where yk(kse;xe(kse)) = byx(kse;xe(kse)) = ½ + ±.
Thus, solar energy prevails in the long run (i.e., kse > k³e) if and only if
½ + ± < b³ or
1
b
(½ + ±) < ³: (3.6)
The threshold energy price (½+±)=b bears a simple economic interpretation.
The solar capital stock 1=b generates a perpetual unit energy °ow and in°icts
the instantaneous cost of 1=b times the e®ective discount rate (the rate of
interest plus the depreciation rate), which in the long run equals ½+±.4 Thus,
(½ + ±)=b is the long-run instantaneous cost of a perpetual °ow of one unit of
energy generated by solar technologies. The same unit energy °ow can be
derived from fossil sources at the instantaneous cost ³. Thus, (3.6) is merely
the condition under which solar energy is more cost e®ective (cheaper) in the
long run, hence will (eventually) prevail. We summarize these considerations
in:
Proposition 3.2. (i) When the price of fossil energy ³ exceeds the threshold
price (½ + ±)=b, the use of fossil energy gradually diminishes and long run
production is based exclusively on solar energy. (ii) When ³ falls short of the
threshold price (½ + ±)=b, in the long run energy is supplied exclusively from
fossil sources.
We refer to economies satisfying condition (3.6) as solar-based while economies
for which the reverse condition holds are classi¯ed as fossil-based. Condition
4When kse > k³e, Proposition 3.1 and equation (3.4) imply yk(^ k; ^ x) = yk(kse;xe(kse)) =
½ + ±.
14(3.6) holds if and only if kse > k³e, which in turn (noting Property 3.1(ii))
holds if and only if the singular curve crosses the steady state curve above the
³-curve. Thus,
Remark 1. The economy is solar-based when the singular curve crosses the
steady state curve above the ³-curve (Figure 1) and is fossil-based when the
singular curve crosses the steady state curve below the ³-curve (Figure 2).
3.3 Transition path
Proposition 3.2 speci¯es the market allocation in the long run. Here
we characterize the entire transitional path. Consider an economy with a
capital endowment k0 < min(ks³;kse) and a vanishing solar capital stock.
Regardless of whether the economy is fossil-based or solar-based, initially the
competitive market allocation entails no investment in solar capital (¶ = 0)
and the economy grows along the x³ curve using fossil energy exclusively.
For fossil-based economies (depicted in Figure 2), investment in solar capital
never takes place (i.e., the ¶ = 0 regime prevails inde¯nitely) and the economy
approaches a steady state at the point (k³e;x³(k³e)), where the equilibrium
and x³ curves intersect and conditions (3.4) and (2.8) are satis¯ed.
A solar-based economy (depicted in Figure 1) evolves along the x³ curve
until it reaches (ks³;xs(ks³)), where the x³ curve intersects the singular curve.
Upon reaching this point, the solar investment policy switches to the singular





s³)) ¡ c(t) ¡ ±k
s³ ¡ ³[x
s(k
s³) ¡ ba(t)]; (3.7)
leaving k constant at ks³ and reducing the use of fossil energy such that the
total energy use remains ¯xed at xs(ks³). As soon as a(t) is large enough
15to supply the entire energy demand, i.e., when ba(t) = xs(ks³), both types of
capital, k(t) and a(t), grow simultaneously along the singular curve (with solar
investment given by (3.3)) towards the steady state (kse;xs(kse)), where the
singular curve intersects the steady state curve (see Figure 1) and conditions
(3.4) and (3.2) are satis¯ed.
We summarize this behavior in:
Proposition 3.3. The market allocation for an economy endowed with k(0) =
k0 < min(ks³;kse) and a(0) = 0 is characterized as follows:
(i) When (½ + ±)=b < ³ (solar based economies), the market processes
evolve along the following three phases: (a) An initial fossil phase (with ¶(t) =
a(t) = 0), in which the economy grows along the x³ curve until it reaches the
intersection point (ks³;xs(ks³) with the singular curve xs. (b) A coexistence
phase, in which k(t) and x(t) are held ¯xed at ks³ and xs(ks³), respectively,
while fossil energy input xf(t) shrinks and solar energy input ba(t) increases
until the use of fossil energy vanishes. (c) A solar phase, in which xf(t) = 0
and k(t) and a(t) grow together along the singular curve towards a steady state
at the intersection point (kse;xs(kse) of the singular and steady state curves.
(ii) When (½ + ±)=b ¸ ³ (fossil based economies), no investment in solar
energy ever takes place (¶(t) = a(t) = 0) and the economy evolves along x³
towards a steady state at the intersection point (k³e;xe(k³e) of x³ and the
steady state curve.
The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Remark 2. It follows from the explicit speci¯cation in Proposition 3.3 that
the optimal policy is unique.
16Each of the phases described in Proposition 3.3 can be recast as a standard
dynamic optimization problem with a single state variable. Solving for the
optimal processes during each phase, and determining the durations of the
phases by the transversality conditions associated with the transition from
one phase to the other, the complete time dependence of the socially optimal
processes is derived. We denote the market state processes by k¤(t) and a¤(t),
and the associated consumption, investment and fossil energy processes by
c¤(t), ¶¤(t) and xf¤(t), respectively. The corresponding capital and energy
prices, de¯ned by (2.4) and (2.5), are denoted r¤(t) and p¤(t).
3.4 Competitive equilibrium
The allocation processes characterized above constitute a competitive equi-
librium for the economy described in Section 2. This means that: (i) house-
holds anticipating the processes ¶¤(t), xf¤(t) and a¤(t) will choose to consume
c¤(t) and save k¤(t), (ii) ¯nal good ¯rms facing the energy price p¤(t) and
the capital rental rate r¤(t) will demand the inputs k¤(t) and x¤(t) to pro-
duce y(k¤(t);x¤(t)), (iii) fossil energy ¯rms facing the energy price p¤(t) and
solar capital a¤(t) will supply xf¤(t), and (iv) managers of solar ¯rms, antic-
ipating the energy and capital price processes p¤(t) and r¤(t), will adopt the
investment policy ¶¤(t) which gives rise to the solar capital process a¤(t).
Notice that households are not the only forward looking agents in the
economy, since managers of solar ¯rms (unlike managers of ¯nal good and
fossil energy ¯rms) make intertemporal investment decisions. The interaction
between the various actors in the economy is thus more involved than the stan-
dard situation in which all ¯rms maximize instantaneous pro¯ts. Nonetheless,
the property that absent market failures, a competitive equilibrium is optimal
17is retained (see Tsur and Zemel 2009b, Section 4 for a veri¯cation).
4 Environmental regulation
The market allocation ignores external e®ects and is therefore suboptimal.
If the economy is solar-based (Figure 1), the market failure will diminish over
time as the economy builds up solar capital and gradually drives fossil energy
out of production (cf. Proposition 3.3(i)). In fossil-based economies (Figure
2) the market failure persists and a correction requires regulatory measures.
We focus on fossil-based economies and study two regulation policies: emission
taxes (price regulation) and a cap on fossil energy use (quantity regulation).
We ¯nd signi¯cant di®erences in the responses corresponding to each policy
and relate these di®erences to how the policies a®ect the threshold condition
(3.6).
We focus on external e®ects that are global in nature (e.g., emission of
greenhouse gases) hence require international coordination and enforcement,
and assume that the regulatory measure is exogenously imposed on the econ-
omy (e.g., by an international treaty). Even when the regulation is locally
determined, its goal is set according to some global criteria and can be taken
as exogenous to the economy under consideration.5 We thus assume that
a tax or a cap policy is exogenously imposed and study their e®ect on the
competitive allocation.
5A case in point are the various policies aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emission that
are implemented locally (see Bushnell et al. 2008) while international attempts to reach a
global (post Kyoto) agreement drag on for reasons well understood (Barrett 2003).
184.1 A fossil energy tax
Consider a regulatory measure in the form of a tax ¯ imposed on xf (or,
equivalently, on emission of greenhouse gases). The e®ective price paid by the
¯nal good ¯rms for fossil energy becomes ³ +¯.6 Thus, the fossil tax has the
same e®ect as an increase in the cost of fossil fuel. The situation is depicted
in Figure 3. Increasing the price of fossil energy tilts the x³ curve downward.
This is so because the diminishing marginal productivity of energy requires
reducing the energy input, for each capital input, when the price of energy is
increased. The upper x³-curve corresponds to the original, tax free situation.
The middle and lower x³-curves are the results of taxing fossil energy at the
rates ¯1 and ¯2, respectively, with ¯1 < ¯2. Point A in ¯gure 3 is the original,
tax-free long-run equilibrium. Upon levying the fossil tax ¯1, the x³ curve
tilts downward and becomes the curve labeled x³+¯1 in Figure 3. The new ³-
curve intersects the steady state curve xe at point B, which lies above point C
where the singular and steady state curves intersect. Therefore, the economy
maintains it fossil-based type (cf. Remark 1) and no incentive to invest in
solar energy is created in response to increasing the price of fossil energy from
³ to ³ +¯1. However, the shift to the new equilibrium (From point A to point
B in Figure 3) entails a reduction in the use of fossil energy due to its higher
price.
Imposing the higher tax rate ¯2 tilts the ³-curve further downwards to the
curve x³+¯2 which crosses the steady state curve xe at point D { below the
intersection C of the singular and steady state curves. Recalling Remark 1, we
6We assume that the tax proceeds are not redistributed back in the economy but paid
to an external fund (e.g., to buy emission permits from foreign countries or to ¯nance an
environmental super fund that handles the damage).
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Figure 3: Consequences of taxing fossil energy.
¯nd that the economy changes its type and becomes solar-based. As a result
(Proposition 3.3(i)) it builds up solar capital gradually and eventually drives
fossil energy out of the energy sector as it moves toward the new equilibrium
point C. The tax reduces the pro¯tability of fossil energy, the use of which will
therefore diminish. We note that this regulation tool can take advantage of
the high sensitivity of the market allocation to the fossil price when the latter
is close to its threshold value. When this is the case, a relatively low tax
rate can change the characterization of the economy and eliminate emissions
altogether.
The dynamic characterization (Proposition 3.3) provides further insights
on the implications of this policy. First, the lowering of the x³ curve implies
a corresponding decrease in the steady state capital stock ^ k and consumption
rate ^ c. Thus, the bene¯ts of the reduced emission can be weighted against
20the smaller objective for every value of ¯, helping to determine the optimal
tax rate for the economy (when the regulator is free to do so). Second, the
lowering of the x³ curve entails immediate reduction in emissions, since x³(k)
is lower at any k level along the curve and not only at the eventual steady
state. This raises interesting possibilities regarding the time pro¯le of the tax
rate ¯. Early on, when x³(k) falls short of the exogenous bound, a lower tax
rate may be imposed, to be gradually increased as the economy expands and
the demand for energy increases. A similar increase in time of the emission
tax has been derived in Tsur and Zemel (2009a) as a tool to eliminate the
hazard of catastrophic environmental events. We leave a more detailed study
of these questions to future work.
4.2 A fossil energy cap
Suppose that a cap ¹ x
f
1 on the per capita °ow of fossil energy is imposed on
a fossil-based economy. For the cap to be e®ective, it must be smaller than the
equilibrium fossil energy °ow under the cap-free economy, i.e., ¹ x
f
1 < ^ xf where
^ xf = x³(k³e). The policy is enacted at t = 0, when the capital and energy
inputs are k0 and x³(k0), respectively (point A in Figure 4). If x³(k0) > ¹ x
f
1,
the policy requires an immediate reduction of energy input to the allowed rate
¹ x
f
1 (point B in Figure 4). Otherwise, the economy (and use of fossil energy)
grow until the cap is reached. Upon reaching the allowed fossil energy cap,
the economy evolves along the x = ¹ x
f
1 line towards a steady state at point
C, where the horizontal line intersects the steady state curve. The economy
remains fossil-based, deriving energy solely from fossil sources, but the rate of
energy use is reduced in compliance with the cap restriction.
Suppose now that the more stringent cap ¹ x
f
2 is imposed instead. The econ-
21x xe(k): yk (k,x) =U + G
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Figure 4: Consequences of imposing a cap on the use of fossil energy.
omy initially moves to point D by reducing the use of fossil energy to ¹ x
f
2 and
evolves along the x = ¹ x
f
2 line until it reaches point E, where this line intersects
the singular curve. At this point, with energy and capital inputs given by
¹ x
f
2 and ¹ k2, respectively, yielding the capital rental rate r = yk(¹ k2; ¹ x
f
2) ¡ ±
(cf. equation (2.4)), solar ¯rms ¯nd it bene¯cial to start investing in solar
capital. The economy then evolves along the singular curve towards a steady
state at point F where the singular and steady state curves intersect. During
this phase the economy continues to derive energy from fossil sources at the
permitted rate ¹ x
f
2 and augments it with solar power at the rate xs(k) ¡ ¹ x
f
2.
We summarize these results in Proposition 4.1, making use of the following
22notation: (kse;xse) is the point of intersection between the singular and steady
state curves, and kfe is the capital stock at which the horizonal line ¹ xf crosses
the steady state curve xe(k).
Proposition 4.1. suppose that a cap ¹ xf is imposed on a fossil-based econ-
omy whose equilibrium energy input exceeds ¹ xf. (i) If ¹ xf ¸ xse the economy
approaches a steady state at (kfe; ¹ xf) and derives its energy input solely from
fossil sources. (ii) If ¹ xf < xse, the economy approaches a steady state at
(kse;xse), where the energy input is divided between fossil sources (at the cap
rate ¹ xf) and solar power (at the residual rate xse ¡ ¹ xf).
The proof is outlined in Appendix C. In Figure 4, ¹ x
f
1 > xse corresponds to
case (i) of the Proposition and the stringent cap policy ¹ x
f
2 < xse corresponds
to case (ii). The horizontal segments BC (for ¹ x
f
1) and DG (for ¹ x
f
2) can be
considered as the e®ective replacements of the ³ curve segment from A to
(k³e;x³e) in forming the loci of the optimal trajectories under the imposed
caps. Case (ii) o®ers the novel feature of simultaneous long term use of both
energy sources. Without the cap, coexistence of the two energy types does not
occur at all for fossil based economies, and can last only for a ¯nite duration
in solar based economies. The persistence of simultaneous use under the cap
policy can be interpreted in terms of the threshold condition (3.6). Under this
policy, the fossil price ³ is augmented by the shadow price associated with the
constraint ¹ xf ¡ xf ¸ 0. When the constraint is moderate, i.e. ¹ xf > xse, even
the augmented price is insu±cient to reverse the inequality of the threshold
condition and induce solar investments. The characterization of the economy
as fossil based remains valid, but fossil energy use is ¯xed at the constrained
rate. More stringent caps entail larger shadow prices, and the threshold
23condition (including the shadow price of the fossil cap constraint) implies a
solar-based economy. However, the shadow price obtains a positive value
only when fossil energy is used at the corner rate xf = ¹ xf. The fossil rate
xf does not vanish in this case and the steady state must involve, therefore,
the coexistence of both energy sources. Indeed, the cap restriction does not
make fossil less pro¯table; it only restricts its quantity. Thus, if fossil energy is
pro¯table without the restriction (which is the case for fossil-based economies),
it will be used at the permitted rate also after the cap is imposed.
5 Conclusions
We study prospects for the penetration of solar energy technologies in a
competitive economy, where energy (an essential factor of production) can be
generated from polluting (fossil) or clean (solar) sources. We characterize
the evolution of the market allocation processes and provide a necessary and
su±cient condition for solar energy to prevail in the long run. This condition
is speci¯ed in terms of the e±ciency of solar energy generation (b), the price
of fossil fuel (³) and the long term price of capital (½+±) and shows the e®ects
of these parameters on the economic viability of solar energy in a competitive
environment. The presence of the threshold condition implies large variations
in the market response to price (tax) and quantity (cap) regulation policies
that address the externalities associated with the use of fossil energy.
The analysis simpli¯es in a number of ways. First, no account is taken
of fossil fuels scarcity. With scarcity included, the price of fossil energy will
increase over time as the fossil reserves shrink, increasing the desirability of
solar technologies. In this respect our analysis is somewhat overpessimistic
24about the prospects of solar energy. Second, the e±ciency of solar energy
generation can increase due e.g. to learning by doing or as a result of dedicated
R&D e®orts that consume resources (Dasgupta and Heal 1979, Chakravorty
et al. 1997, Tsur and Zemel 2003, 2005, Gerlagh et al. 2009, and references
they cite).
For example, learning by doing can be modeled by assuming that the solar
e±ciency parameter b is an (increasing) function of the aggregate solar capital
A. Under the unregulated market allocation no investment in solar energy will
take place and the fossil based economy will not realize the potential bene¯ts of
learning by doing. A possible remedy for this market failure comes in the form
of a subsidy on investments in solar capital that will induce the solar ¯rms to
undertake such investments. The corresponding increase in b(A) might su±ce
to meet the threshold condition, following which time solar investments will
proceed even without the subsidy. A temporary subsidy (¯nanced e.g., by
the proceeds of an emission tax) can change the classi¯cation of the economy
from fossil based to solar based and eliminate emissions in the long run.
Finally, e®ects of sustained economic growth can be considered (as in
Tahvonen and Salo 2001, Smulders and de Nooij 2003, Tsur and Zemel 2009a).
Any of these changes will constitute a valuable extension.
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25Appendix
A Properties of the characteristic curves
Property 3.1
Proof. Suppose xe(0) = x0 > 0, then yk(0;x0) = ½ + ± violating (2.2) which
states that yk(0;x) = 1 for all x > 0. Suppose that the xe(¢) curve crosses
the k axis at some state k0 > 0, then yk(k0;0) = ½ + ± violating (2.2) which
implies yk(k;0) = 0 for all k > 0. Therefore the xe(¢) curve must approach
the origin. Similar considerations apply for the other two curves, establishing
(i).

































Since multiple crossings imply alternating signs for the slope di®erence, this























B Characterization of the market allocation







subject to (2.12)-(2.15), given k(0) = k0 and a(0) = 0. The bound ¹ ¶ is assumed
to be large enough so that the singular policy is feasible, and the k(¢) process
decreases under the ¶ = ¹ ¶ regime for the relevant k domain.
When no risk of confusion arises, we suppress the time argument t. The
current-value Hamiltonian corresponding to (B.1) is
H = u(c) + ¸[y(k;x
f + ba) ¡ ³x
f ¡ ¶ ¡ c ¡ ±k] + °[i ¡ ±a] (B.2)
where ¸ and ° are the current value costates of k and a, respectively. De¯ning
Á ´ ° ¡ ¸; (B.3)
the necessary conditions for optimum include:
u
0(c) = ¸; (B.4)
and
yx(k;x) · ³; equality holding if x
f > 0: (B.5)





¹ ¶ if Á > 0
0 if Á < 0
¶s if Á = 0
(B.6)
27where ¶s is the singular policy, de¯ned by (3.3) or (3.7). The costate variables
evolve according to
_ ¸ = ¡¸[yk(k;x) ¡ (½ + ±)]; (B.7)
and
_ ° = ¡¸byx(k;x) + °(½ + ±); (B.8)




¡½t = 0: (B.9)
De¯ne
¤(k;x) ´ yk(k;x) ¡ byx(k;x) (B.10)
and combine (B.3), (B.7) and (B.8) to obtain
_ Á ´ _ ° ¡ _ ¸ = ¤¸ + Á(½ + ±); (B.11)








The analysis is carried out in terms of the geometry of the market process
vis-a-vis the three characteristic curves. Each of these curves divides the (k;x)
plane to regions above and below it (i.e. with x exceeding or falling short of
xj(k); j = e;s;³, respectively). We say that the (k;x) process crosses a curve
from below when it moves from the region below the curve to the region above
it, even if the x(¢) process decreases at the crossing time (in which case the
crossing might be more appropriately described as from the right). We also
say that some policy is maintained inde¯nitely if it is followed from some time
onwards to t ! 1. We refer to the solution of (B.1) interchangeably as
\processes," \market processes" or \optimal processes".
28Property B.1. Under the optimal policy: (i) _ c > 0 if (k;x) is above xe(¢);
(ii) _ c < 0 if (k;x) is below xe(¢); (iii) a steady state must reside on the xe(¢)
curve.
Proof. Taking the time derivative of (B.4) and using (B.7), we ¯nd
¡u
00(c)_ c=u
0(c) = yk(k;x) ¡ (½ + ±): (B.13)
Condition (3.4) which de¯nes the steady state curve and assumption (2.2)
imply that yk(k;x) > ½ + ± above xe(¢) and the reverse relation holds below
xe(¢). Noting that ¡u00=u0 > 0, we conclude that _ c > 0 above xe(¢) and _ c < 0
below xe(¢). A steady state entails _ c = 0, hence it must reside on the steady
state curve.
Property B.2. The optimal (k;x) process proceeds along or above x³(¢). This




0 if x³(k) ¡ ba · 0
x³(k) ¡ ba if x³(k) ¡ ba > 0
;
Proof. (i) According to (2.8) and (2.2), yx(k;ba) > ³ when x³(k) ¡ ba > 0.
This situation violates (B.5) and xf = x³(k) ¡ ba > 0 must be invoked to
augment ba and satisfy (B.5), shifting (k;x) to reside along the x³(¢) curve.
If x³(k) ¡ ba < 0 then yx(k;ba) < ³. However when xf > 0, (2.2) implies
yx(k;ba) > yx(k;xf + ba) = ³, where the latter equality follows from (B.5).
The contradiction implies that xf = 0 holds above x³(¢).
The following corollary holds:
Property B.3. Maintaining the ¶ = ¹ ¶ regime inde¯nitely cannot be optimal.
29Proof. According to Property B.2, the (k;x) process proceeds on or above
x³(¢). If the ¶ = ¹ ¶ regime is followed inde¯nitely, the decreasing k process
will fall below k³e at some ¯nite time, following which x³(k) > xe(k) holds.
Thus, _ c > 0 (Property B.1) and, with ¶ = ¹ ¶, the capital stock k will be
depleted in ¯nite time, which (with ´ > 1) reduces utility to ¡1 and cannot
be optimal.
Property B.4. (i) Under the singular regime the (k;x) process proceeds along
the singular curve. (ii) If ¶ = 0 at some time when (k;x) is below xs(k) then:
(a) the process cannot switch to another ¶-regime as long as (k;x) remains
below xs(k) and (b) the (k;x) process must eventually cross xs(k). (iii) If
¶ = ¹ ¶ at some time when (k;x) lies above xs(k) then: (a) the process cannot
switch to another ¶-regime as long as (k;x) remains above xs(k) and (b) the
(k;x) process must eventually cross xs(k). (iv) Except for the intersection
point (ks³;x³(ks³)), a singular process must proceed with xf = 0.
Proof. (i) According to (B.6), the singular regime entails Á = _ Á = 0, hence
(B.11) implies ¤(k;x) = 0 which de¯nes xs(¢).
(ii) The properties of y(¢;¢) (see (2.2)) imply that ¤(k;x) is negative or
positive for (k;x) below or above xs(¢), respectively. Suppose that a (k;x)
process is initiated at some time t0 below xs(¢) with ¶(t0) = 0, so that ac-
cording to (B.6) Á(t0) < 0. With ¸ > 0 and ¤(k;x) < 0, (B.12) ensures that
Á(t)e¡(±+½)t is bounded from above by the negative constant Á(t0)e¡(±+½)t0 so
long as the (k;x) process remains below the singular curve, establishing (a).
To verify (b), notice that if (k;x) never crosses xs(¢), the policy ¶ = 0 will be
retained inde¯nitely (since Á remains negative), which cannot be optimal for
the following reason. With ° > 0, we see that ¸(t)e¡(±+½)t is also bounded











which is bounded away from zero only if k ! 1 at large t. Under the ¶ = 0
regime, the state a decreases, hence eventually x³(k) ¡ ba > 0 must hold and
from that time on both k and x increase along x³(¢) (Property B.2(i)). For
large enough k, Property 3.2(iii) ensures that x³(k) < xe(k), where _ c < 0
(Property B.1). However, the policy of keeping k and x constant, diverting
the resources required to increase them to enhance consumption, is feasible
and yields a higher value.
(iii) Suppose that a (k;x) process is initiated at some time t0 above xs(¢)
with ¶(t0) = ¹ ¶, so that Á(t0) > 0. Repeating the above argument, we show
that Á(t)e¡(±+½)t is bounded away from zero by a positive constant as long as
(k;x) is above xs(¢), hence the ¶ regime will be maintained. According to
property B.3, this regime cannot hold inde¯nitely, hence the singular curve
must be crossed.
(iv) The singular process proceeds along the singular curve xs(¢), which
lies below or above x³(¢) for k < ks³ or k > ks³, respectively. According to
Property B.2, no process is optimal below x³(¢), while xf = 0 holds above
x³(¢).
Property B.5. (i) If a singular (k;x) process leaves the singular curve to the
region above it, the corresponding ¶ regime changes from singular to ¶ = ¹ ¶ at
the departure time. (ii) If a singular (k;x) process leaves the singular curve to
the region below it, the corresponding ¶ regime changes from singular to ¶ = 0
at the departure time.
31Proof. The singular (k;x) process proceeds with _ Á = Á = 0. Suppose that by
mistuning ¶ the (k;x) process is driven above the singular curve at some time
t0. With Á(t0) = 0 and ¤(k(t);x(t)) > 0, (B.12) implies that Á(t) > 0 at t just
after t0, hence ¶ = ¹ ¶ is adopted above xs(¢). The same considerations show
that leaving to the region below xs(¢) (where ¤(¢;¢) < 0) implies ¶ = 0.
Property B.6. The optimal (k;x) process does not cross xs(¢) from above
with ¶ = ¹ ¶.
Proof. Under the ¶ = ¹ ¶ regime, k(¢) decreases and a(¢) increases. For the (k;x)
process to cross xs(k) from above, its slope must exceed that of the singular
curve, i.e. _ x=_ k > xs0(k) > 0 must hold at the crossing time. Suppose xf = 0
then _ xf ¸ 0 hence _ x ¸ b_ a > 0 while _ k < 0, so crossing from above cannot
occur.
Crossing with xf > 0 can take place place only along the x³ curve. The
latter crosses the singular curve at ks³ from above, hence the crossing requires
that k(¢) increases, which cannot occur under this ¶ regime.
Property B.7. Above xs(¢), the optimal policy is to set ¶ = 0.
Proof. Suppose that ¶ = ¹ ¶ when (k;x) is above xs(¢). According to Property
B.4, the (k;x) process must cross xs(¢) from above before changing the ¶ regime,
violating property B.6. This rules out this regime. The singular regime can
only be applied along xs(¢), so the only possibility left above the singular curve
is ¶ = 0.
We now show that maximal solar investment can be optimal only at the
initial phase:
32Property B.8. A switch to ¶ = ¹ ¶ from any of the other two ¶ regimes cannot
be optimal.
Proof. Above the singular curve, the ¶ = 0 regime is optimal (Property B.7)
hence a switch to ¶ = ¹ ¶ will not take place in this region. Proceeding along
the singular curve cannot change the sign of Á(¢) (see (B.12)) while leaving it
(with Á = 0) to the region below implies ¶ = 0 (property B.5). Below the
singular curve, the singular regime never holds and the ¶ = 0 regime cannot
be switched (Property B.4).
Property B.9. If k < ks³ then the optimal policy is to set ¶ = 0.
Proof. When k < ks³ the x³(¢) curve lies above the singular curve, hence the
(k;x) process (which must proceed on or above x³ { see Property B.2) evolves
above the singular curve. The optimal policy, then, is to set ¶ = 0 (Property
B.7).
An immediate corollary of properties B.8 and B.9 is
Property B.10. A small economy, with k0 < ks³, will never adopt the ¶ = ¹ ¶
regime.
Property B.11. If k < min(ks³;k³e) then the optimal k(¢) process increases.
Proof. When k < min(ks³;k³e) the x³(¢) curve lies above the other two curves,
hence the (k;x) process (which must proceed on or above x³ { see Property
B.2) evolves above the other two curves. This implies an increasing c(¢)
process (Property B.1) and ¶ = 0 as the optimal choice (property B.9). Under
this ¶-regime, a(¢) does not increase. We show that k(¢) increases. Consider
the function
D(t) ´ y(k(t);x(t)) ¡ c(t) ¡ ³x
f(t) ¡ ±k(t) (B.14)
33With ¶ = 0; _ k = D. Taking the time derivative, we ¯nd
Ä k = _ D = [yk ¡ ±]_ k + [yx ¡ ³]_ x
f + yxb_ a ¡ _ c (B.15)
Now, the second term of (B.15) vanishes because xf = _ xf = 0 above x³(¢)
and yx ¡ ³ = 0 on x³(¢). If k decreases, the ¯rst term is negative above xe(¢)
because yk > ½+± > ±. The third term is not positive when ¶ = 0 while _ c > 0
above the steady state curve. Thus, both _ k and Ä k are negative, implying that
if k decreases it must vanish at a ¯nite time, which cannot be optimal.
Property B.12. The optimal state trajectory does not cross the steady state
curve xe(¢) from below with ¶ = 0 or ¶ = ¶s.
Proof. Crossing xe(¢) from below must occur at k ¸ k³e, i.e. above or along
the x³(¢) curve. In the former case, xf = 0 and ¶ = 0 implies that a decreases,
hence k must also decrease. (Otherwise, the (k;x) process moves away from
xe(¢).) It follows that all the terms of (B.15) are negative or vanishing at and
after the crossing time, hence Ä k < 0. Thus, k will continue to decrease at an
increasing rate and will inevitably fall below min(ks³;k³e), violating property
B.11. Crossing xe(¢) from below along x³(¢) at k³e also involves a decreasing
k process, hence is ruled out using the same argument, which can also be used
to rule out the crossing under the singular regime.
B.1 Solar based economies
The economy is solar based when kse > k³e or equivalently, when ½+± < b³
(see the derivation of 3.6). In this case ^ k = kse and ^ a = xe(^ k)=b, as depicted
in Figure 1.
Property B.13. The optimal state trajectory does not cross the singular curve
xs(¢) at k < ^ k from below with ¶ = 0.
34Proof. Crossing the singular curve from below must occur at k ¸ ks³, i.e.
above or along the x³(¢) curve. A crossing with ¶ = 0 implies for both cases
that both k and a do not increase. For k < ^ k, the crossing occurs above
the steady state curve. It follows that all the terms of (B.15) are negative or
vanishing at and after the crossing time, hence Ä k < 0. Thus, k decreases at an
increasing rate and will inevitably fall below ks³, violating property B.11.
Property B.14. When (k;x) is below xs(¢) and k < ^ k, then the optimal policy
is to set ¶ = ¹ ¶.
Proof. If ¶ = 0 the (k;x) process must cross xs(¢) from below before the ¶
regime is switched (Property B.4). Increasing k only moves the (k;x) process
further away (below) from xs(¢), hence the crossing must take place with k < ^ k,
violating property B.13 and ruling out the ¶ = 0 policy. The singular policy
is also ruled out away from the singular curve, and the only possibility left is
¶ = ¹ ¶.
B.1.1 More on singular processes
Property B.15. A singular process cannot leave the singular curve while k <
^ k.
Proof. In view of property B.5, driving a singular (k;x) process above the
singular curve entails ¶ = ¹ ¶ above this curve, violating Property B.7. Driving
a singular (k;x) process below xs(¢) entails ¶ = 0 at k < ^ k, violating Property
B.14.
Property B.16. A singular process with ks³ < k < ^ k must increase (i.e. both
k and a increase).
35Proof. Above the ³ curve, xf = 0 hence x = ba and a and k vary in the
same direction along the increasing singular curve. With k < ^ k, the singular
process proceeds above the steady state curve, where c(¢) increases. Thus,
the process cannot settle at a steady state in this region. Suppose that it
decreases, then it cannot reverse its direction, nor can it leave the singular
curve. The decreasing process, then, must proceed towards ks³ where it is
forced to leave the singular curve, violating property B.15. This leaves an
increasing process as the optimal option.
The crossing point (ks³;x³(ks³)) marks an exception to this rule because a
time period during which both k(t) = ks³ and x(t) = xf(t) + ba(t) = x³(ks³)
remain ¯xed while the solar-fossil mix varies cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the
solar investment rate (3.7) is adopted during this period. Once xf vanishes and
the solar component takes over, however, the process must leave the crossing
point and increase along the singular curve with ¶s given by (3.3) in accordance
with property B.16.
Property B.17. A singular process with ks³ < k < ^ k must approach the
intersection point (^ k;xs(^ k)).
Proof. While k < ^ k the singular process cannot leave xs (property B.15)
or settle at a steady state hence it must increase (property B.16) towards
(^ k;xs(^ k)).
Property B.18. A singular process with k > ^ k must decrease.
Proof. Consider a singular process proceeding along the singular curve segment
with k > ^ k, i.e. below the steady state curve. According to property B.1,
c(¢) must decrease along this process. Since the steady state curve will never
36be crossed (property B.8) this decrease in consumption will never reverse. If
k(¢) increases, a(¢) must increase as well along the increasing singular curve.
This behavior, however, is inconsistent with decreasing consumption, since
the alternative policy of maintaining both capital stocks ¯xed, diverting the
resources required to increase them to enhanced consumption is also feasible
and yields a higher utility. A steady state cannot be optimal away from the
steady state curve, hence the process must decrease.
B.1.2 Convergence
The ¶ = ¹ ¶ regime can hold only during the initial phase of the optimal
policy, and only for a ¯nal duration (properties B.3 and B.8). Thus there
exists some ¯nite time t0 following which only the other two ¶ regimes can be
optimal. (For small economies, t0 = 0, see property B.10.) To study long
term behavior, we restrict attention to t > t0 hence consider only these other
two regimes.
Property B.19. An optimal process converges to (^ k;b^ a) = (kse;xe(kse)).
Proof. Proceeding below the steady state curve, the optimal process can never
cross to the region above it (property B.12), hence the consumption process
must decrease inde¯nitely. To avoid vanishing consumption at a ¯nite time,
the rate of decrease must approach zero, hence the process must approach
the steady state curve (property B.1). The point of approach cannot have
k < ^ k, because this region implies the excluded regime ¶ = ^ ¶ (property B.14).
At k > ^ k, the ¶ = 0 regime holds and with xf = 0, x(¢) = ba(¢) decreases
exponentially, hence the (k(¢);x(¢)) process, restricted to the vicinity of the
steady state curve, must converge to the intersection point with the singular
37curve, where the singular ¶ = ¶s policy allows to maintain a(¢) ¯xed at its
steady state value.
Suppose that the (k(¢);x(¢)) process proceeds above the steady state curve.
If it crosses this curve, it can never return back to the region above it, hence it
will converge to the steady state as shown above. We can, therefore consider
processes restricted to the region above the steady state curve inde¯nitely.
In this region, the process must also proceed on or above the singular curve
(outside the interval [ks³;^ k] the singular curve lies below one of the other curves
so the process must proceed above it, while within this interval the region below
the singular curve implies the excluded ¶ = ¹ ¶ policy, see property B.14). The
process, then can proceed either above all three curves, or along the singular
curve with k(¢) 2 [ks³;^ k] or along x³ with k(¢) < ks³. In the former case,
xf = 0 and the ¶ = 0 regime implies that x(¢) = ba(¢) decreases exponentially,
and since k(¢) is bounded from below by min(k0;ks³) (see property B.11) the
process must reach the singular or the ³ curve (whichever lies higher at the
point of arrival) in ¯nite time. Neither curve can be crossed, nor can the
process return to the region above them. It can, however, either increase
along x³ with ¶ = 0, using fossil energy at the required rate to make up for
the shrinking solar capital, or switch to the singular regime and increase along
xs towards the intersection point with the steady state curve (property B.16).
If the ride along x³ takes place ¯rst, it must end up at (ks³;xs(ks³)), where
the singular regime takes over, eventually bringing the process along xs to the
steady state.
Property B.20. Characterization of the optimal process for a small solar-
based economy.
38Consider a small economy endowed with k0 < ks³ and a0 = 0. The initial
policy for this economy must proceed with ¶ = 0 (property B.9) hence the
¶ = ¹ ¶ policy will never be adopted (property B.10). With a(¢) ´ 0 the optimal
process must increase (property B.11) along the ³ curve because the region
above this curve requires that xf = 0 and ba(¢) = x(¢) > x³(k(¢)) (property
B.2). This ride along x³ must proceed until the singular curve is reached at
ks³. The latter curve cannot be crossed, because the region below it implies
the excluded ¶ = ¹ ¶ policy (property B.14). Neither can the process leave
the ³ curve with a = 0 as stated above. Moreover, the process cannot stay
at the crossing point under the ¶ = 0 regime because a steady state is not
allowed away from xe. Thus a switch to the singular regime must occur
upon reaching ks³. The process, however cannot leave the crossing point and
increase along the singular curve (i.e. above x³) so long as the solar stock a(¢)
falls short of x³(ks³), because otherwise a positive rate of fossil energy would
be required above x³, violating property B.2. Thus, a quasi-stationary and
singular coexistence phase must take place to allow solar capital to build up,
leaving k(¢) and x(¢) ¯xed but shrinking xf(¢) gradually to make room for the
increasing use of solar energy. Once the use of fossil energy ceases, staying
at (ks³;xs(ks³)) is no longer possible, because this point does not qualify as a
steady state. Leaving the singular curve is not possible below ^ k (property
B.15) hence the singular process must increase along this curve (property
B.16) reaching towards the intersection point (kse;xs(kse)) with the steady
state curve. A further increase along the singular curve implies crossing the
steady state and an inde¯nitely decreasing consumption process hence the
process must settle at a steady state in the intersection point.
39B.2 Fossil based economies
We consider now the case ½ + ± > b³ which implies kse < k³e, so that
^ k = k³e; ^ x = xe(^ k) and ^ a = 0, as depicted in Figure 2.
Observe ¯rst that the crossing point (kse;xe(kse)) of the steady state and
singular curves that served as a steady state in the previous subsection lies
here below the ³-curve hence cannot belong to an optimal process (Property
B.2). What other point might serve as a steady state? Obviously it must lie
on the steady state curve, hence above the singular curve so the singular policy
cannot be optimal in this state. The ¶ = ¹ ¶ regime cannot hold inde¯nitely,
hence does not correspond to a steady state. With ¶ = 0, a steady state
implies also a = 0 so x = xf. Thus, the state must lie on the ³-curve, hence
the only possibility is the crossing point (k³e;xe(k³e)). Indeed, for this type
of economies the following property holds
Property B.21. If k < k³e then ¶ = 0 and k(¢) increases.
Proof. When k < k³e the x³ curve lies above the other two curves, hence the
(k;x) process (which must proceed on or above x³, see Property B.2) evolves
above the other two curves. The proof, then, follows that of properties B.9
and B.11.
Next, we verify that the corresponding proofs are not a®ected by the change
in geometry and all the properties established for the solar based economies
(except those that deal with the interval ks³ < k < kse which is not relevant
for the present geometry) hold also in the the present case. Put together,
they entail the following characterization
40Property B.22. Under the optimal policy, the (k(¢);ba(¢)) process converges
to (^ k;b^ a) = (k³e;0) with ^ x = ^ xf = xe(^ k).
The proof follows closely the reasoning for the case of solar based economies,
hence will not be reproduced here.
Property B.23. Characterization of the optimal process for a small fossil-
based economy.
Consider a small economy endowed with k0 < k³e and a0 = 0. The initial
policy for this economy must increase with ¶ = 0 (property B.21) along x³
(because a(¢) = 0 excludes the region above this curve). The process cannot
increase beyond the intersection at k³e because crossing the steady state line
implies that the consumption process will decrease inde¯nitely, while settling
at a steady state at the intersection point (diverting the resources required
to increase k(¢) and xf(¢) to enhanced consumption) is feasible and yields a
higher value. A transition to the ¶ = ¹ ¶ regime is not allowed, nor can a
switch to the singular regime take place away from xs. The optimal process,
then, is restricted to a fossil-based increase along x³ towards the steady state
(^ k;b^ a) = (k³e;0) with ^ x = ^ xf = xe(^ k), as asserted in property B.22.
Put together, properties B.19 and B.22 establish Proposition 3.1, and prop-
erties B.20 and B.23 establish Proposition 3.3.
C Cap regulation
Introducing the constraint ¹ xf ¡ xf ¸ 0 to the optimization problem (B.1)
adds the term º(¹ xf ¡xf) to the Hamiltonian (B.2), where º ¸ 0 is the shadow






> ³ if xf = ¹ xf
= ³ if 0 < xf < ¹ xf
< ³ if xf = 0
(C.1)
Property B.2, then must be extended to allow for the possibility that the
optimal (k;x) process proceeds below x³(¢) when xf = ¹ xf. This is achieved






0 if x³(k) ¡ ba · 0
x³(k) ¡ ba if ¹ xf > x³(k) ¡ ba > 0:
¹ xf if x³(k) ¡ ba > ¹ xf
(C.2)
This change implies an extension of Property B.4(iv) so as to allow a singular




0 if k > ks³
¹ xf if k < ks³;
(C.3)
with solar input ba = xs(k) ¡ xf supplying the residual energy required to
keep the process on the singular curve.
The proof of Proposition 4.1, then, follows the arguments of Appendix B,
when the intersection point of the x = ¹ xf line and the singular curve replaces
(ks³;xs(ks³)) as the relevant point for policy change (from the fossil phase to
the coexistence phase). The details are omitted to avoid duplication.
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